

Lecture 24 - Dec 2

Background


Safety-Critical vs. Missional-Critical
Professional Engineers: Code of Ethics
Safety Property/Invariant
Verification vs. Validation

Announcements/Reminders

- Today's class: notes template posted
- **Lab4** released
- A reference paper for the **tabular method** (**Lab4**)
- **Review session** survey active now!
- **Exam guide**, example questions released


Formal Methods ^{mathematical} discrete math
 (i.e. computer system is discrete 0,1)

$x \in \{1, 0, 1, 0\}$
 $y \in \{1, \dots, 53\}$



Safety-Critical System

1. nuclear power plant
+ nuclear shutdown system




2. radiation

3. "glove"

4. pacemaker (pacemaker challenge)


5. auto-pilot & auto-driving.



Acceptance Criteria

① Req. precise

↳ no ambiguities, no contradiction



$\begin{pmatrix} P \\ \neg P \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow \text{false}$

↳ complete

↳ no missing scenarios



laps

Goal: ^{verification!} Verify if Implementations Conforms to Requirement

EHSC 202

in different semantic domains : cannot compare directly!

Assume:
unambiguous
non-contrad.
complete




Conform?

1. manual
2. Automated


translate / formalize

nuclear power plant

$sensor_value < T$



e.g. discharge
prof obligations
entails



same semantic domain

Mission-Critical vs. Safety-Critical

Safety critical

When defining safety critical it is beneficial to look at the definition of each word independently. **Safety** typically refers to being free from danger, injury, or loss. In the commercial and military industries this applies most directly to human life. **Critical** refers to a task that must be successfully completed to ensure that a larger, more complex operation succeeds. **Failure** to complete this task compromises the integrity of the entire operation. Therefore a safety-critical application for an RTOS implies that execution failure or faulty execution by the operating system could result in injury or loss of human life.

Safety-critical systems demand software that has been developed using a well-defined, mature software development process focused on producing quality software. For this very reason

the **DO-178B** specification was created. DO-178B defines the guidelines for development of aviation software in the USA. Developed by the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), the **DO-178B standard** is a set of guidelines for the production of software for airborne systems. There are multiple criticality levels for this software (A, B, C, D, and E).

These levels correspond to the consequences of a software failure:

- Level A is catastrophic
- Level B is hazardous/severe
- Level C is major
- Level D is minor
- Level E is no effect

SCS

MCS

Safety-critical software is typically DO-178B level A or B. At these higher levels of software criticality the software objectives defined by DO-178B must be reviewed by an independent party and undergo more rigorous testing. Typical safety-critical applications include both military and commercial flight, and engine controls.

Mission critical

A **mission** refers to an operation or task that is assigned by a higher authority. Therefore a mission-critical application for an RTOS implies that a **failure** by the operating system will prevent a task or operation from being performed, possibly preventing successful completion of the operation as a whole.

Mission-critical systems must also be developed using well-defined, mature

software development processes. Therefore they also are subjected to the rigors of DO-178B. However, unlike safety-critical applications, **mission-critical software** is typically DO-178B level C or D. Mission-critical systems only need to meet the lower criticality levels set forth by the DO-178B specification.

Generally mission-critical applications include navigation systems, avionics display systems, and mission command and control.

SCS

vs.

MCS


(1) ~~x~~ $SCS \Leftrightarrow MCS$

(2) ~~x~~ $SCS \Rightarrow MCS$

(3) ~~x~~ $MCS \Rightarrow SCS$

SCS \subseteq MCS


\Rightarrow



Safety Property / Invariant

↳ Every possible state of the system should satisfy it.


↳ If there's at least one state where the inv. does not hold, it is not satisfied.




assumption:
req. already given
Verification: Are we building the product right?
process
of construction

→ 4312.
Validation: Are we building the right product?
Are the req.
given truly
intended by
customers?

Building the product **right**?



Building the **right** product?





for validation,
critical on
what's given.

Certifying Systems: Assurance Cases



Research

Research on "Assurance Cases" if interested!



Source: https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/whitepaper/2009_019_001_29066.pdf

Exam Info

- g. booklet (sketch)
- ans. booklet (no sketch)

- When: 9am to 12pm, Thursday, December 11 (ACW 206)
- Coverage: **Everything** (lecture materials & labs)
 - + slides, iPad notes
- Even problems that look **challenging** at first are built on the **same foundational techniques** you've learned and practiced in **lectures** and **labs**. A **solid, reflective** grasp of the basics will take you **farther** than memorizing examples.
- Format: **Mostly Written**
 - + explanations/justifications + **write math expressions** + **calculations**, **proofs**
- Restrictions:
 - + **One-sided** ^{hand-written} computer-typed, min 10pt data sheet
 - + No sketch paper (Exam booklet includes it) + **No** calculator
- What you should bring:
 - + Valid, Physical Photo ID (strict)
 - + Water/Snack

!

ASCII → math

ARZ

↓
- separate proofs
- prod name logit.

Handwritten symbols and arrows at the bottom of the page.